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PARTIES 
The Children: 
A.D., born September 19, 2000. She is the four year-
old daughter of the Appellant. She and her brother are the 
real parties in interest. Her best interests was represented by 
the Office of the Guardian ad Litem. 
Z.D., born April 6, 2002. He is the two year-old son 
of the Appellant. He and his sister are the real parties in 
interest. His best interests was represented by the Office of 
the Guardian ad Litem. 
The Parents: 
S.B.D., "the Father." He is the Father of the two 
Children. He was the Respondent at the trial level and an 
Appellant before the Court of Appeals. He is a Respondent 
before this Court. 
L.D., "the Mother." She is the Mother of the two 
Children. She was the Respondent at the trial level. She was 
not a party before the Court of Appeals. 
The Agency: 
Division of Child and Family Services, "the 
Division" or "DCFS." The Division was the petitioner at 
trial and the appellee before the Court of Appeals. The 
Division is also petitioning for a writ of certiorari. 
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the interest of 
A.D. & Z.D. 
Children under eighteen 
years of age. 
OFFICE OF THE GUARDIAN 
Petitioner, 
v. 
S.B.D. & L.D., 
Respondents. : 
CaseNo.20040837-SC 
BRIEF OF GUARDIAN ad LITEM 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over the petition for writ of certiorari to review the 
court of appeals's opinion, entered July 29, 2004. Jurisdiction is conferred by Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(5) (2004). 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. This Court framed the sole question for review: "Whether the court of appeals 
applied the correct standard of review in its assessment of the sufficiency of the 
evidence." Attachment 6. This Court exercises its certiorari jurisdiction by reviewing the 
decision of the court of appeals and not that of the trial court. InreB.B.. 2004 UT 39, 1^ 
5, 94 P.3d 252. The issue of whether the court of appeals applied the appropriate 
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standard of review to assess sufficiency of evidence is one of law, which this Court 
reviews for correctness. Hughes v. Caffertv. 2004 UT 22, If 18, 89 P.3d 48 (citing State 
v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994)). 
2. Given that sufficiency-of-evidence reviews have a marshaling requirement, a 
related question is whether the Utah Court of Appeals may review the merits of a 
sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim where the appellant has not marshaled the evidence. 
This Court has determined that, because the court of appeals functions as an appellate 
body and not as a trier of fact, it may not. "The court of appeals does not review the trial 
court's factual findings where the party challenging those findings fails to marshal the 
evidence. Instead, the court of appeals must 'assume that the record supports the findings 
of the trial court.'" Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corp., 2004 UT 28,110, 94 P.3d 193 
(quoting Moon v. Moon. 1999 UT App 12, f 24, 973 P.2d 431) (emphasis added). 
STATUTES, RULES, CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
"Abused child" includes a minor less than 18 years of 
age who has suffered or been threatened with nonaccidental 
physical or mental harm, negligent treatment, or sexual 
exploitation. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-103(l)(a)(i). 
20030750-CA 
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In determining whether a minor is an abused child or 
neglected child it may be presumed that the person having the 
minor under his direct and exclusive care and control at the 
time of the abuse is responsible for the abuse or neglect. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-305.1. 
OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS OF OPINION 
In re Z.D. and A.D.. 2004 UT App 261,98 P.3d 40. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Nature of Case: This Court granted certiorari review over a single question: 
"Whether the court of appeals applied the correct standard of review in its assessment of 
the sufficiency of the evidence." Attachment 6. The final order on review is an opinion 
where the Utah Court of Appeals reversed a juvenile court adjudication order 
determining that Z.D. is an abused child and that S.D. is a neglected child as a sibling-at-
risk. 
Course of Proceedings: The Division filed a petition seeking juvenile court 
jurisdiction over the two Children. R.29-34. 
20030750-CA 
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Disposition at Trial: After a thirteen-day trial on the merits, the juvenile court 
prepared a seven-page, single-spaced memorandum decision analyzing the evidence and 
concluding that the younger child was abused, the older child was neglected as a sibling 
at risk, and therefore both Children came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. 
See Attachment 1. The Father appealed the adjudication order. R.847. 
Disposition on Appeal: The Utah Court of Appeals issued an opinion reversing 
the juvenile court's adjudication order. In re Z.D., 2004 UT App 261, 98 P.3d 40. 
Attachment 2. This Court granted certiorari review over one question: "Whether the 
court of appeals applied the correct standard of review in its assessment of the sufficiency 
of the evidence." Attachment 6. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In his appellate brief to the Utah Court of Appeals, the Father did not marshal the 
evidence supporting the juvenile court's findings. Instead, he selected those portions of 
the record, including statements from his own expert witnesses, that supported his 
version of the facts, which were disputed, and which were ultimately rejected by the 
juvenile court. The court of appeals, did not adopt the juvenile court's findings, but, in a 
surprising move, virtually adopted the fact statement from the Father's brief. What 
follows is a brief summation of the supporting evidence presented during thirteen days of 
20030750-CA 
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trial. The best overview of the facts is in the juvenile court's seven pages of findings. 
Attachment 1. See Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, U 30, 100 P.3d 1177 (appellate court 
"heavily" relies on findings of fact to resolve fact-intensive issues of law). 
Up until Saturday morning, November 16, 2002, both parents stated they were able 
to stand seven month-old Z.D. ("the Child") on their laps while he held onto their fingers, 
allowing him to kick his feet against their laps and bear weight on both legs. State Exh. 
3, 6 & 7. The Mother later remembered that she had played with the Child that morning, 
holding him while he bounced both his feet against her lap. Exh. 6. Later that morning, 
she and the maternal grandmother ("the Grandmother") left to spend the day shopping, 
leaving both seven-month-old Z.D. and two year-old A.D. in the Father's care. Exh. 6. 
The Father recalled that between 12:30 and 1 p.m., when he claimed Z.D. had awakened 
from a nap, the Child could no longer bear weight on his left leg, he favored the leg, and 
he cried when it was touched. Def s Exh. 3. When the Mother returned home late 
Saturday afternoon, she also noticed that the Child could no longer bear weight on his left 
leg and was favoring it. Id. 
Approximately twenty-four hours after the Father first noticed something was 
wrong, he brought the Child to Primary Children's Medical Center. The Child was 
20030750-CA 
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immediately given Lortab for the pain. Tr.63. The medical staffs initial impression was 
that the injury was non accidental. Tr.26. 
The Child was seen by pediatrician Bruce Herman, M.D., who diagnosed the Child 
with a broken left femur. The bone was broken completely through, it was slightly 
displaced and a fragment had broken off. State's Exh. 6. The Parents initially claimed 
the Child was suffering from a flu shot. Exh. 1. They then claimed the injury could have 
been caused by their two year-old daughter who was "rough" with the Child. Tr.24-25, 
Exh. 1. When the Parents were told that neither explanation fit the injury, they denied 
that the Child had suffered any recent trauma severe enough to cause the injury. A 
skeletal survey revealed the Child had also suffered a skull fracture, which had healed. 
Again, neither Parent could offer an appropriate explanation for the skull fracture, 
although they suggested the Child could have fractured his skull when he fell twelve 
inches from a baby swing onto a carpeted floor. State's Exh.6. 
The Division filed a petition seeking juvenile court jurisdiction over the Child and 
his two year old sister. R.29-34. The matter was tried to the juvenile judge, who listened 
to experts testify regarding the age of the femur fracture, the timing of the symptoms, the 
nature of the skull fracture, the identity of the various care givers, the Parents' changing 
20030750-CA 
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stories, and the fact that the femur fracture was nonaccidental. The trial court agreed with 
the Division's and Guardian's experts that the Child's femur was broken, in a 
nonaccidental1 manner, during the time he was alone with the Father. See Letter from Dr. 
Herman, Dr. Frasier and Dr. Hansen, State's Exh. 6. Attachment 4.2 
The Father had his own theory of the femur fracture: He claimed the Grandmother 
had inadvertently broken the Child's femur three days earlier, on Wednesday, in the 
presence of the Child's mother, while trying to unstick the Child's leg from a walker 
("the walker theory"). The Grandmother testified that after the Child had supposedly 
broken his femur, the largest bone in his body, he cried for only three to five seconds and 
was quickly calmed by a few pats on the back. Tr. 222-23, 291. The Parents claimed the 
pain of the broken femur was masked for three days by Tylenol, which was why the 
Child showed only normal fiissiness until Saturday afternoon. At trial, the Parents 
1
 The word "nonaccidental" is the operative term in determining whether an injury 
amounts to abuse. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-103(l)(a)(i) ('"Abused child' includes a 
minor less than 18 years of age who has suffered or been threatened with nonaccidental 
physical or mental harm, negligent treatment, or sexual exploitation."). 
2Bruce Herman, M.D., when pressed by the defense to state a possible mechanism 
for the fracture, opined the mechanism could "likely" have been axial loading. Again, 
when pressed, he quantified the term "likely" to mean 51/49 percent. However, he, along 
with Dr. Frasier and Dr. Hansen, and even defense expert Dr. Smith, agreed that the 
clinical evidence supported that the Child was injured, by some mechanism, on Saturday, 
when he was alone with the Father. State's Exh. 7 & Def. Exh. 15. Attachment 5. 
20030750-CA 
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denied their earlier statements, which were contemporaneously documented by several 
witnesses, in which they said the Child could, as late as Saturday morning, bear weight 
on his left leg when they had him stand on their laps. Affidavit of Bruce Herman, State's 
Exh. 39, Attachment 3, Tr.771. 
In further support of the walker theory, the Mother claimed that she always 
diapered and dressed the Child in such a manner as to never touch his left leg. She 
demonstrated this method to the judge, who found it not credible. Tr.863-64, R.879. 
The Grandmother also demonstrated her attempt to unstick a doll's leg from a walker. 
Tr.223.3 Again, the juvenile court found it not plausible that the Child would suffer a 
complete femur fracture and be completely comforted and quieted in only three to five 
seconds by a few pats on the back. Tr.222-23. R.879, Attachment 1. 
The walker theory was rejected by Dr. Herman, who was permitted to sit through 
and listen to the testimony of the defense experts. Tr.69, 312. The walker theory was 
also rejected by Dr. William Nixon, a pediatric radiologist, and by Dr. Karen Hansen, of 
3
 The transcripts in no way convey the bizarre nature of this demonstration, nor do 
they convey the detrimental effect the demonstration had on the Mother's credibility and 
on the walker theory. The court of appeals never had the benefit of viewing this 
important demonstrative evidence. See In re Water Rights v. Pinecrest Pipeline, 2004 UT 
67, If 67, 98 P.3d 1 (appellate court "particularly reticent to second-guess" findings based 
on demonstrative evidence). 
20030750-CA 
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the Safe and Healthy Families Team of Primary Children's Medical Center. Tr.709, 
1545.4 
The juvenile court rejected the walker theory. The court concluded that the 
Child's femur fracture occurred Saturday, while he was in the care of the Father. R.2-7, 
29-34. The court concluded that the Child had earlier suffered a skull fracture, and not, 
as the Parents claimed, a disappearing skull suture. The court was unable to determine 
whether the skull fracture was accidental or nonaccidental because the fracture was older 
than the femur fracture and difficult to date. R.879, Findings at 2, 6. Still, the juvenile 
court concluded that the femur fracture was nonaccidental and that it occurred when the 
Child was alone with the Father and therefore he was responsible for the injury. Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-3a-305.1 (2004) (court may presume that the person having direct and 
exclusive care and control at the time of the abuse is responsible for the abuse). 
The Father appealed the adjudication order. R.847. Four of the Father's five 
appellate claims involved sufficiency of the evidence.5 Rather than marshal the evidence, 
4In rejecting the walker theory, Dr. Nixon testified: "This is the biggest bone in his 
body at the time. If this was a common fracture that just happened with every day type 
care, we'd be seeing them all the time." Tr.709. 
5The fifth claim went to the trial court's refusal to admit propensity evidence. See 
Father's Appellate Brief at 44-45. 
20030750-CA 
20040837-SC 9 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
he re-argued only that portion of the controverted evidence that supported his theory of 
the case, citing only to those portions of the record supporting his case, and sometimes 
failing to cite at all. See Father's Appellate Brief at 17-19, 22-43, 45-47. 
In a surprising move, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed the juvenile court's 
adjudication order. In re Z.D.. 2004 UT App 26L 98 P.3d 40. Attachment 2. Relying 
on case law from 1955, the panel gave almost no deference to the findings on the basis 
that the findings were judge-made rather than jury-made. Lovett v. Continental Bank & 
Trust Co., 4 Utah 2d 76, 286 P2d. 1065, 1968 (1955) (fact that appellate body could 
come to different conclusion on same set of facts is basis for reversal); cf, In re S.T., 928 
P.2d 393, 401 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (fact that evidence supports more than one result 
does not justify reversal of finding). In addition, the panel justified its re-weighing of the 
evidence by speculating that the juvenile judge "undoubtedly" could not remember and 
assimilate evidence from a thirteen-day trial. Id. at ^ 1 nl, 19, 26 ("Undoubtedly, this 
elongated trial made it difficult for the trial judge to recall the evidence and to place it all 
in context."). Finally, the Z.D. court tacitly approved the Father's failure-to-marshal by 
including a background statement that virtually mirrored the Father's statement of facts, 
including those portions that had no citation, nor support from the record, and which 
were in fact refuted by the record. 
20030750-CA 
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The court of appeals's holding was based on burden of proof and not standard of 
review: "The evidence does not clearly and convincingly establish that Z.D.'s fracture 
was caused by an axial load sometime on Saturday when he was in Father's care." Z.D. 
at f^ 28 (emphasis added). 
In response to separate petitions for certiorari filed by the Guardian ad Litem and 
the Assistant Attorney General, this Court granted review over one issue: "Whether the 
court of appeals applied the correct standard of review in its assessment of the sufficiency 
of the evidence." Attachment 6. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS DID ITS OWN WEIGHING. 
This Court narrowed the issue on certiorari to one: "Whether the Court of Appeals 
applied the correct standard of review in its assessment of the sufficiency of the 
evidence." Attachment 6. The law on this issue is well-settled. When challenging 
sufficiency-of-the-evidence, an appellant must marshal evidence supporting the 
challenged finding and then demonstrate how, despite this evidence, the challenged 
finding is against the clear weight of evidence. 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat 2004 UT 
72, Tf 69, 99 P.3d 801. Where the appellant has not marshaled the evidence, the appellate 
20030750-CA 
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court does not review the claim, but assumes that all findings are supported by the 
evidence. Id. at 70; Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, If 19, 100 P.3d 1177. 
In cases where an appellant has fully marshaled the evidence, which is not the case 
here, the appellate court then reviews the challenged finding using a clearly erroneous 
standard of review. Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a). That means the reviewing court "must decide 
that the factual findings made by the trial court are not adequately supported by the 
record, resolving all disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's 
determination." State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994) (emphasis added). Where, 
as in this case, the findings are based on demonstrative evidence, this Court is 
"particularly reticent to second guess" such findings. In re Water Rights v. Pinecrest 
Pipeline. 2004 UT 67, f 67, 98 P.3d 1. 
The Pena case came to the Utah Supreme Court on certification from the court of 
appeals to resolve the court of appeals's ongoing "confusion" regarding standard of 
review. 869 P.2d at 935 & n.2. In response, this Court clarified its functional 
jurisprudence of appellate review standards. Id. at 937-39. Pena outlined "a fixed 
allocation of power and responsibility between the trial and appellate courts . . . regarding 
questions of fact." Id. 869 P.2d at 938 (emphasis added). Pena held "it will never be 
20030750-CA 
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appropriate for an appellate court to overturn a trial court's factual determinations when 
they have substantial record support." Id. Pena determined that a finding-of-fact review 
was an area in which "the appellate court has a permanently limited role." Id. (emphasis 
added). 
Pena placed sufficiency-of-evidence reviews "at the extreme end of the discretion 
spectrum." Id- at 938-39 (citing Professor Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the 
Trial Court, Viewed From Above, 22 Syracuse L. Rev. 635, 662-63 (1971).6 
The court of appeals has, for the most part followed Pena when reviewing 
challenged findings.7 Likewise, this Court has followed Pena, in particular, by chastising 
6The Rosenberg article can't be found on the Web or in the Matheson Courthouse 
Library. It can be found in the stacks at the S.J. Quinney Law Library. 
7
 See e ^ , In re A.C.. 2004 UT App 255, If 12, 97 P.3d 706; In re ST.. 928 P.2d 
393, 401 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (fact that evidence supports more than one result does not 
justify reversal of finding); In re R.A.J.. 1999 UT App 329, f 12, 991 P.2d 1118 
(responsibility of juvenile judge to hear, consider and weigh evidence); In re E.R., 918 
P.2d 162, 164 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (recognizing specialized expertise of juvenile 
judges); In re G.V.. 916 P.2d 918, 920 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) Guvenile court's function to 
weigh and assess credibility of expert testimony). 
The cases that have not followed Pena are outstanding in their rarity as well as 
their weigh-it-ourselves temerity. See e ^ , In re Z.D.. 2004 UT App 261, ^ 1 n.l & 19, 98 
P.3d 40 (less deference given to bench finding, appropriate to determine whether clear 
and convincing standard met, trial judge can't be expected to remember evidence in 
multi-day trial); InreN.D. v. A.B., 2003 UT App 215, If 14 (re-weighing credibility 
factors of Utah R. Evid. 803(24) to find the evidence "cut both ways"); In re V.K.S.. 2003 
20030750-CA 
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appellants for (1) not marshaling the evidence; (2) re-arguing only the favorable facts, and 
(3) seeking a second opinion. Recently, this Court added a fourth transgression to the list: 
(4) omitting "certain minor evidence, that in combination, could" support the finding. 
Easy Heat at 2004 UT 72, f 71. See also Chen. 2004 UT 82 at 75-76 ("the requirements 
of marshaling still do not appear to be understood with the sense of clarity and urgency 
we desire"). 
In a major departure from Pena, the Z.D. opinion tacitly condoned all four of these 
appellate shortcomings by reversing a fact-intensive finding in the face of (1) no 
marshaling; (2) a re-arguing of only the favorable facts; (3) a bid for a second opinion; 
and (4) an omission of minor, as well as major, evidence.8 
In the present case, despite the clear language and despite the court of appeals's 
normal adherence to Pena, the panel asserted that it need not resolve all conflicts in favor 
UT App 13, Tf 7, 63 P.3d 1284 ("we must do our own weighing"); Davis v. Davis, 2001 
UT App 225, Tf 6, 63 P.3d 676 (appellate court does its own weighing); In re T.H. v. R.HL 
860 P.2d 370, 373 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); State v. Saddler. 2003 UT App 82, 67 P.3d 1025 
(no deference to magistrate's ruling on affidavit), revjd, 2004 UT 105 (granting great 
deference to magistrate). 
8Recently, this Court extended the duty to marshal to issues of law that are 
"extremely fact-sensitive." Chen, 2004 UT 82 at % 20 (failure to marshal evidence 
underlying facts supporting challenged legal issue proved "fatal" to legal argument). 
20030750-CA 
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of the trier of fact and it need not defer to a finding if it was judge-made and not jury 
made. See Z.D. at j^ 19. True to its word, the Z.D. panel proceeded to re-weigh the 
evidence and to make its own findings, without the benefit of marshaling, and without the 
benefit of viewing the demonstrative evidence. As a result of its re-weighing, the panel 
determined that the Child was injured on Wednesday by the Grandmother in the walker 
incident and not by the Father on Saturday in a non-accidental manner.9 
Thus, the court of appeals disregarded its own well-settled case law to second-
guess the weight, credibility and interpretation of the evidence, including demonstrative 
evidence. The question becomes whether the appellate panel had the authority to even 
reach the sufficiency-of-the-evidence issue where the evidence had not been marshaled. 
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ABANDONED 
THE MARSHALING REQUIREMENT. 
This Court has set forth the appropriate appellee response to a failure-to-marshal-
argue-the-favorable-facts brief: The appellee should point to a scintilla of evidence to 
refute the claim of no evidence to marshal. Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, ^  80, 100 P.3d 
9The word "nonaccidental" is the operative term in determining whether an injury 
amounts to abuse. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-103(l)(a)(i) ("'Abused child' includes a 
minor less than 18 years of age who has suffered or been threatened with nonaccidental 
physical or mental harm, negligent treatment, or sexual exploitation."). 
20030750-CA 
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1177. This Court has held that an appellant may not shift the burden to the appellee to 
marshal the evidence. Id. at ^ 78. Written and oral argument should be confined to 
urging the court to decline to consider the claim and then, as a back up position, pointing 
to a scintilla of evidence supporting the challenged finding.10 
In turn, the appropriate appellate court response, the response requested by the 
Guardian and the Assistant Attorney General in this case, is for this Court to "affirm the 
court's findings on that basis alone." Id. at ]f 80.n 
10Here, the Guardian did just that, relying, to the detriment of her young clients, on 
both appellate courts' instructions on handling a failure-to-marshal case. In fact, the 
Guardian pointed out that she was prepared to argue the law, but felt it was inappropriate 
to argue the facts before an appellate panel because the appellate court was required to 
presume that the evidence supported the findings. Chen, 2004 UT 82 at 3; Harding v. 
Bell 2002 UT 108, % 21, 57 P.3d 1093. A panel member disagreed, directing the 
Guardian to argue the facts anyway. 
11
 This Court described the alternative appellate task where there is no marshaling 
would be to comb through the record, assemble the evidence, identify how the trial court 
used this evidence to support the challenged finding and then determine that the decision 
was clearly erroneous. This Court described the task as a "colossal commitment of time 
and resources." Chen, 2004 UT 82, at f^ 82 n.16. In this case, this Court would have to 
comb through 879 pages of legal documents and exhibits and 1592 pages of transcripts. 
Even then, this Court would not have access to the demonstrative evidence not reflected 
in the transcripts. In re Water Rights v. Pinecrest Pipeline., 2004 UT 67, Tf 33, 92 P.3d 1 
(appellate court "particularly reticent to second-guess findings based on demonstrative 
evidence). 
20030750-CA 
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In the spirit of offering f,a scintilla of evidence that supports a court's findings," 
Chen, 2004 UT 82, ^  82, and mindful that this is not the forum to argue the facts, the 
following is offered to provide a representative example of where the panel relied to its 
detriment on the Father's statement of facts, which statement was contradicted by the 
record. 
The Z.D. panel quoted only that portion of the Dr. Smith letter that was quoted out 
of context in the Father's brief: 
Smith wrote a letter dated December 11, 2002 in which he 
explained that the fracture could result from the forceful 
wedging of the leg over a fulcrum (as in the walker incident), 
but that it would be "difficult to know the degree of force that 
would be required to produce this fracture by this 
mechanism." 
Z.D. at Tf 9. This portion of the letter, when read in isolation and at first blush, appears to 
support the Father's walker theory. In fact, the letter, which was later admitted in its 
entirety over defense counsel's vehement objection, rejects the walker theory, as shown in 
its concluding paragraph: 
I feel that once this type of fracture occurred, given the 
amount of displacement on the initial film, that we would 
expect to have significant pain with activities such as diaper 
changing or any manipulation of the limb. It is, therefore, 
difficult to match the chronology of the fracture to the onset 
of symptoms being approximately three days later. 
20030750-CA 
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Def. Exh. 15, Attachment 5. 
Because the Father did not marshal the evidence and because the court of appeals 
did not perform the "colossal commitment of time and resource" to comb through the 
voluminous record, the court of appeals had no basis to reverse the fact-intensive finding 
of abuse. Chen, 2004 UT 82 ^ 82 n.16. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the court of appeals's opinion and should affirm the 
juvenile court's adjudication order without remand to the appellate court because the 
Z.D. panel abandoned the marshaling requirement and abandoned the concomitant 
presumption that the record supports the findings. In addition, the Z.D. court did not 
give due deference to the trier of fact who heard the witnesses, saw the demonstrative 
evidence, chose among the experts and determined credibility and weight. 
DATED this 17th day of January 2005. 
MARTHA PIERCE 
Guardian ad Litem 
20030750-CA 
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ATTACHMENT 1 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND DECREE, 
AUGUST 19, 2003 
Supp. R. 879. 
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An 
tea 
the Third District Juvenile Court 
Saii: Lake County/ State of Utah 
j :t5Lc of Utah/ iriLerest of 
Dunsmore, Alexis 9-19-2000 
Dunsmore, Zachary 4-6-2002 
' Persons under eighteen years 
bindings-of Fact, Conclus. 
of Law, and Decree 
Case Ivos. 153373, 169372 
ions 1 
The above matter came before this Court for trial on 3-21, 
3-24, 4-21, 5-i, 5-2, 5-6, 5-3, 5-12, 5-19, 5-21, 5-27, 6-11, and 
6-12 of 2003, pursuant to the State's Verified Petition filed 11-
22-2062. The State was represented by Amy Jackson, Assistant 
Attorney General; the Office of Guardian ad Litem was represented 
by Kobert Parrish, attorney at law; the mother, Lisa Dunsmore, 
was present and represented by Ronald Wilkinson, attorney at law; 
the father, Stephen Dunsmore, a.k.a. Brig Dunsmore, was present 
and represented by Blake Nakamura, attorney at law. 
Having now considered the testimony of witnesses, reviewed 
the numerous exhibits, and listened to arguments of counsel, 
and/or, read the closing arguments submitted at counsel's option, 
the Court finds and concludes that the State has proven its 
Verified Petition of 11-22-2002 by clear and convincing evidence 
in the following particulars, and makes the following 
Findings of Fact: 
1. That the parents of the above named children are 
Stephen, a.k-a- Brig, and Lisa Dunsmore, who reside in West 
Jordan, Utah; 
2. That on or about 11-17-2002, Zachary, a seven (7) month 
old, non-ambulatory child, was admitted to the Primary Children's 
Medical Center suffering from a fractured femur; 
3. The fractured femur was due to non-accidental trauma and 
not self-inflicted; 
4. The femur fracture suffered by the child occurred at a 
tiute when he was under the direct and exclusive care and control 
of his father, Stephen, a.k.3. Brig, Dunsmore; 
5. The explanations as to the cause of the injury provided 
by the parents is inconsistent with the medical testimony; 
5, ^-Initial skeletal surveys taken upon the child*'s 
admission z V.rten->s o >_r.e noso itai, also revealed a possible skull 
fr.icture to the child's head. Subsequent additional tests v/er< 
performed on the child's skull to definitively answer if there 
vr7<2 
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wc<s a skull fracture; but the medical experts could not reach a 
consensus on the issue. However, from the evidence presented, 
the Court is convinced there was a skull fracture, and not an 
afsociated suture as the parents aver. Nonetheless, neither the 
source nor the cause of the skull fracture is known or suggested, 
and it has not been established whether it was accidental or non-
accidental in nature. Neither has it bsen established in whose 
care and control the child was under when the alleged skull 
fiacture occurred nor when it may have occurred. These issues 
axe all problematic and/ therefore, the Court finds the evidence 
if: inconclusive and insufficient to conclude that the skull 
fiacture was the result of neglect or abuse by either parent. 
Court's Commentary: 
This has been a most difficult case, not only because of its 
length, but because of the complex factual and legal issues 
piesented. The Court is not insensitive to the emotions of all 
parties involved in the trial of this matter. The Court ascribes 
no ill-will toward either parent in making its findings. The 
issue at trial has never been about the character of the parents 
nor about their love for their children. The Court senses the 
love the parents have for their children. Rather, the facts 
dictate the Court's findings and conclusions. 
Through a rather protracted proceeding, the Court has been 
handed a State's case built primarily on medical, communicative, 
and circumstantial evidence. The parents' cases are also built 
around medical testimony coupled with an explanation as to the 
instrumentality involved, what the parents said and did, but also-
on circumstantial evidence. Not surprisingly in this type of 
case, there has been no testimony from any eyewitnesses who 
allegedly observed how the leg injury occurred. Rather, the 
Court is left with attempts £o reconstruct what happened from 
medical experts/ and from testimony by persons close to the 
events as they developed. 
The parents claim neither any personal knowledge nor provide 
any explanation as to the source of the injury. However, the 
grandmother recalls the child's leg getting caught in an infant 
"walker" on Wednesday, 11-13-2002. As she attempted to place the 
child into the ''-walker", the child let out a shrill cry. In her 
efforts to extract the child's leg from the "walker", she asserts 
that she must have caused the femur to fracture during that 
event. She demonstrated to medical staff and in the court 
setting how she must have accidentally or inaiverdentiy caused 
the fracture to the leg. Hers is the only explanation provided 
the Court as to the source of the fractured fenur from any of the 
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parties. 
Medical experts testified and generally agreed that the pal 
arc the symptoms attendant to the leg fracture would be 
significant and that the fracture would be extremely painful to 
the child. According to the medical testimony, symptoms of 
fiissiness/ irritability, sensitivity to touch, inability to bear 
weight on the injured leg, crying, and general discomfort would 
aJi be expected to be present from the moment of initial 
infliction of the injury, and would persist in greater or lesser 
degree depending upon the type of activity exerted on the child. 
Daily changing of diapers, clothing, bathing, handling of child 
for naps, being held by parent or others, being transported in a 
car, being placed in and out of a car seat, etc., are all routine 
activities which would be noticably affected by the child's 
response to the pain of the injury, and are readily detectable 
and observable by a caretaker. 
From Wednesday, 11-13, to Saturday, 11-16, neither the 
mother nor the grandmother noticed any unusual, or out-of-the 
ordinary, stress, pain or discomfort to the child. The 
grandmother described the child as being comforted by her within 
three (3) to five (5) seconds after the shrill" cry, and he 
appeared fine for the rest of the day. He remained in the 
"walker" and she noticed no swelling or pain in his leg. She 
testified she checked his leg and observed nothing out of the 
ordinary and she stated he exhibited no discomfort. She said the 
child was handled in and out of a car seat without distress. To 
her, everything seemed normal with the child. 
The mother testified the child exhibited no more than usual 
or ordinary fussiness on Thursday, 11-14, or Friday, 11-15, 
although the child did have flu shots on Friday. Sven on the 
morning of Saturday, 11-16, she* fed the child, played and talked 
with, him, even placed him in the "walker" and removed him again 
when he got fussy, and placed him on the floor in a vburrito'#/ 
wrap (a word used to describe the method of firmly wrapping a 
blanket around an infant). She stated he .appeared normal and 
fine when she went shopping with her mom (grandmother), and left 
him in the care of his father, Steve or Brig, Dunsmore. While 
shopping, she called home about three (3) times to check on the 
child, and nothing out of the ordinary was reported.by the 
father. When she arrived home in the evening about six p.m., or 
shortly thereafter, the child was on the floor on a blanket. She 
picked him up, interacted with him, and held him on her lap. She 
noticed his left leg appeared a bit bent, so she rubbed it 
thinking it was cue to the flu shot. It was then she noticed he 
did not want to stand on his left leg. As his symptoms worsened, 
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the father took him to Primary Children's Medical Center for 
examination on Sunday, 11-17. Subsequently, the child was 
admitted to the hospital with a fractured femur. 
The Court has received testimony from numerous doctors, 
fcjuily members, and others. Where permitted or allowed, each has 
rendered an opinion. Many of the expert witnesses were called in 
aj'ter the fact, so to speak, to assist in possibly explaining 
what could have happened, and what the possible instrumentality 
may have been which caused the leg injury. 
The chief attending physician on duty at the time of the 
admission of the child, unequivocally testified that the femur 
fracture was the result of"non-accidental-trauma, and would have 
required significant and excessive force to cause such a complex 
femur fracture- The same attending physician observed the 
demonstration by the grandmother of the "walker" as the possible 
instrument and he medically discounted it as the source of 
injury. His opinion was supported by several other physicians, 
all experienced 3nd trained in diagnosing and treating cases of 
suspected child abuse, or non-accidental trauma. Several of 
these doctors currently serve on the child abuse protection ream 
at the Primary Children's Medical Center, 
Assuming for the sake of argument that the source of the 
injury was the *walker", then one has to assume it (the injury) 
occurred on Wednesday/ ii-13-2002, as described by the 
grandmother, and as asserted by both parents. The father 
describes symptoms as suddenly appearing in the afternoon of 
Saturday, 11-16. The father testified he saw little of the child 
on either Wednesday, 11-13, or Thursday, 11-14, or Friday, 11-15, 
because he got home from work after the child had been put to bed 
for the night. As described by the father, and confirmed by the 
hospital physicians and other doctors, the attendant symptoms of 
the leg fracture were significant, and the doctors testified that 
the symptoms would be present from the initial receipt of rhe 
injury on Wednesday, and persist on Thursday, Friday, and 
Saturday until hospitalization, which occurred on Sunday, 11-17. 
However, the testimony from the mother and grandmother, the two 
persons who almost exclusively spent Wednesday,- Thursday, and 
Friday with the child, does not reveal any observations of the 
expected symptoms in the child. Not even on Saturday morning was 
there a mention of concern for the child's behavior or any 
symptoms out of the ordinary. Those symptoms were first noticed 
by the mother on Saturday evening upon her return home from 
slopping when she interacted with the child. It was then she 
realized he favored his left leg and would not bear weight on It. 
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The Court is borh astonished and dumbfounded why the 
symptoms would be absent on Wednesday, 11-13, Thursday, 11-14, 
Friday, 11-15, and on Saturday morning of the 16th, but yet make 
such a sudden and demonstrative appearance on the afternoon of 
the same day, Saturday, 11-16, after being in the sole care of 
the father all day. 
The parents assert that any number of drugs, among them 
Tylenol and Ibuprofen, may have masked the symptoms. However, 
the Court is not persuaded that the minimal doses of minor pain 
killers as mentioned in the testimony would mask the symptoms 
attendant to the child's femur fracture. Additionally, it is 
asserted, by the mother particularly, that she used extreme 
caution and care in her handling of the child while bathing him, 
changing his diapers, changing is clothes, etc-, thus perhaps 
masking any symptoms the child may otherwise have exhibited such 
that they could not be readily detected by either parent. 
Further, they assert that even the administration of the flu 
shots to his leg must have been done with such great care as to 
mask any possible detection by medical personnel, a nurse and a 
doctor, of symptoms from the supposed Wednesday fracture. To 
this Court, that is inconceivable and not believable. 
If the "walker" was the source and instrumentality of the 
leg fracture then, according to medical testimony, the symptoms 
attendant with such injury would have been present on Wednesday, 
Thursday, Friday, and on Saturday morning as they were on 
Saturday evening, or late afternoon that day. As well-intended 
as the grandmother's explanation may be, the Court discounts her 
story as the source of the leg fracture-
The Court is convinced that the leg fracture occurred on 
Saturday, 11-16, during the time he was in his father's care. 
Unfortunately, the details of how the child received the femur 
fracture has not been provided to the Court but sufficient and 
clear and convincing evidence has been established for the Court 
to conclude it was non-accidental trauma without a reasonable and 
acceptable explanation from either parent as to its causation. 
UCA 78-3a-305.1, provides: 
"In determining whether a minor is an abused child or 
neglected child it may be presumed that the person having the 
minor under his direct and exclusive care and control at"the time 
of the abuse is responsible for the abuse or r.eglect." See State 
ex rel L,M, v. State, 2001 U? App. 314, 37 ?,3d 115?. 
This presumption is rebuttable, but the Court finds that m e 
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Pare six 
father has failed to rebut it. Having rejected the grandmother's 
explanation that the incident which broke the child''s leg 
occurred on Wednesday, 11-13, via the ^walker", the legal 
presumption applies to the father as he had the child M*..under 
his direcr and exclusive care and control at the time of the 
abuse.,.", and is therefore legally responsible for the abuse 
and/or neglect. 
As to the skull line discovered on x-rays taken of the 
child/ the Court is convinced that it is the result of a fracture 
and not an associated suture. The Court is persuaded, by Dr. 
Nixon's years of experience in the field and finds his testimony 
and opinion believable and more credible than the other experts 
who testified. In any event, the Court has already concluded the 
evidence is not clear and convincing that the skull fracture was 
non-accidental in nature. 
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the 
Court enters the following 
Conclusions of Law: 
1. That said child, Zachary, is an Mabused child'' in that 
he has suffered non-accidental physical harm, or negligent 
treatment, pursuant to UCA 73-3a-i03(l) fa) (I); 
2- That said child, Zachary, is a neglected child in that 
he has been subjected to mistreatment or abuse, pursuant to UCA 
73-3a-103(l) (s) (i) (3); 
3. That said child, Alexis, is a neglected child in that 
she is at risk of being a neglected or abused child because 
another child in the same home is a neglected or abused child, 
pursuant to UCA 73~3a-(l) (s) (1) (S) . 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, the Court enters the following 
Decree: 
1. That this matter is set for a dispositional hearing on 
, before Judge Nolan, at the Sandy 
Courthouse, 210 West 10000 South, Sandy, Utah; 
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2. Thar the Division of Child and Family Services is 
directed to submit a written reunification service plan for r>oth 
parents for the Court's consideration, and that copies be 
provided to Court and counsel five (5) days prior to the hearing 
date scheduled above; 
2. That previously conducted psychological evaluations of 
both parents be made available for the Court's consideration at 
the dispositional hearing; 
4. Previous orders regarding custody, guardianship, and 
visitation shall remain as ordered pending further review and 
order of the Court. 
Dated this l'5r\fdaj/ of Aucust, 2003, 
Blak^N^^&r^^a^o^e^at law 
Ron wYlki^s^>^^tttc^^^at law 
Stephen anh'^Jbthfel^liK^rfbre, parents 
Amy Jackson, ''frMau£e?*of Attorney General 
P.ob Parrish, Office of Guardian ad Litem 
Division of Child and Family Services 
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2004 UTApp 261, *; 505 Utah Adv. Rep. 25; 
2004 Utah App. LEXIS 82, * * 
State of Utah, in the interest of Z.D. and A.D., persons under eighteen years of age. S.B.D. 
and L.D., Appellants, v. State of Utah, Appellee. 
Case No. 20030750-CA 
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH 
2004 UTApp 261; 505 Utah Adv. Rep. 25; 2004 Utah App. LEXIS 82 
July 29, 2004, Filed 
NOTICE: [**1] THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE PUBLICATION IN THE 
OFFICIAL REPORTER. 
PRIOR HISTORY: Third District Juvenile, Salt Lake Department. The Honorable Olof A. 
Johansson. 
DISPOSITION: Reversed. 
CASE SUMMARY 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The Third District Juvenile, Salt Lake Department (Utah), 
determined that one of appellant parents1 children suffered a femur fracture while in 
the father's care, and concluded the child was abused and neglected while in the father's 
care, and that another was a neglected child as a result of being in the same home. The 
children were removed from the home. The parents appealed the adjudication, 
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. 
OVERVIEW: After the infant child was seen at a hospital, abuse was suspected and 
reported. The juvenile court determined that sufficient clear and convincing evidence had 
been established to conclude the child's broken leg was a non-accidental trauma without 
a reasonable acceptable explanation from either parent as to its causation. On appeal, 
the father argued the juvenile court erred in finding the State established abuse by clear 
and convincing evidence. None of the expert witnesses could provide an opinion as to 
how much force would be required to cause the fracture with either an axial load or a 
walker incident. Noticeably removed from the court's findings was any mention of, or 
explanation for, the absence of external injuries. If the fracture were caused by an axial 
load, the mechanism believed by some State witnesses to be the probable cause, it 
would almost always be accompanied by a soft tissue injury like bruising or swelling. The 
appellate court could not say that, given the evidence presented, the trier of facts could 
reasonably conclude that it was highly probable that the fracture was the result of 
nonaccidental trauma inflicted by the father. 
OUTCOME: The judgment was reversed. 
CORE TERMS: fracture, walker, symptom, leg, doctor, femur, axial, knee, bone, caretaker, 
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probable, trauma, fussy, left leg, nonaccidental, afternoon, leverage, swelling, bruising, 
morning, dose, load, pain, demonstration, teething, noticed, burrito, wrap, trier, clear and 
convincing evidence 
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes • Hide Headnotes 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > Substantial Evidence Review^ 
tf^iThe standard for assessing whether evidence is "clear and convincing" has been 
articulated as follows: While it rests primarily with the trial court to determine 
whether the evidence is clear and convincing, its finding is not necessarily 
conclusive, for in cases governed by the rule requiring such evidence the sufficiency 
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OPINIONBY: Russell W. Bench 
OPINION: OPINION (For Official Publication) 
BENCH, Associate Presiding Judge: 
[*P1] S.B.D. and L.D. (Father and Mother) challenge the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting the juvenile court's determination that Z.D., one of their children, suffered a 
femur fracture while in Father's care. After receiving evidence, n l the court determined 
that "sufficient and clear and convincing evidence has been established . . . to conclude it 
was non-accidental trauma without a reasonable and acceptable explanation from either 
parent as to its causation." We reverse. 
Footnotes 
n l The trial court received evidence on thirteen different days, spanning the time from March 
21, 2003 to June 12, 2003. Undoubtedly, this elongated trial made it difficult for the trial 
judge to recall the evidence and to place it all in context. 
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End Footnotes [**2] 
BACKGROUND 
[*P2] Father took care of his infant son, Z.D., and two-year-old daughter, A.D., for most of 
the day on Saturday, November 16, 2002, while Mother was away from the home. Early that 
morning, before leaving, Mother gave Z.D. a dose of Tylenol for the earache, constipation, 
and teething that Z.D. had been experiencing in the days prior. He was not given another 
dose of Tylenol until later that evening. Z.D. took a nap in the afternoon. When Z.D. awoke, 
he was fussy, and Father noticed that he was favoring his left leg by holding his foot up so 
that it did not touch Father's lap. Father laid Z.D. in his lap and rubbed the leg because 
Father thought the flu shot Z.D. had received on Friday, November 15, 2002, was bothering 
him. Z.D. did not like having his leg rubbed and continued to be fussy. Father wrapped him 
up tightly in what the parents called a "burrito wrap" and held him. Z.D. stopped being fussy 
and appeared comfortable. When Mother returned home that evening, she also noticed that 
Z.D. was favoring his left leg. Mother and Father attributed Z.D.'s favoring of his left leg to 
the flu shot, but called Kids Care just to be sure. Kids Care reassured them that [**3] there 
was no need to worry, and that Z.D. did not need to be examined. That night Z.D. slept 
normally and did not display fussiness indicative of pain. 
[*P3] On Sunday morning, November 17, 2002, when Z.D. continued to favor his left leg, 
Father took him to Primary Children's Medical Center (Primary) to be examined. The first 
doctor at Primary to examine Z.D. moved his leg around some, but could not find anything 
wrong. Another doctor came and placed Z.D. on an examination table. The second doctor 
pushed Z.D.'s legs up against his torso, straightened and bent his legs, and wiggled and 
moved them around. Z.D. cried fairly intensely. After Z.D.'s leg was x-rayed, Father was told 
that Z.D.'s left femur was fractured just above the knee. Z.D. was described by hospital 
workers as cheerful, interactive, alert, and slightly fussy, but consolable. At some point, Z.D. 
was examined by Dr. Bridgette Sipher. Sipher noted that Z.D. was in no apparent distress 
except when his left leg was manipulated. Additionally, there was no bruising anywhere on 
Z.D.'s body, and no fever, redness, or swelling. Sipher recommended Tylenol or ibuprofen for 
pain, with Lortab to be considered if necessary. [**4] Although there was decreased 
movement in Z.D.'s left leg, Z.D. was still moving it independently. 
[*P4] In accordance with Primary's policy to notify the State whenever a fracture is 
discovered in a nonambulatory child, the emergency room staff immediately notified the 
Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS). n2 The emergency room staff also notified the 
Center for Safe and Healthy Families, a group at Primary responsible for identifying and 
investigating suspected cases of child abuse. Dr. Bruce Herman, a pediatrician and member 
of the Center for Safe and Healthy Families team7 took charge of the investigation and 
examined Z.D. at Primary the following day, Monday, November 18, 2002. After interviewing 
Father and Mother, Herman concluded that Z.D. had become acutely symptomatic on 
Saturday, November 16, which would be consistent with the fracture occurring on that day. 
He also opined that the mechanism causing the fracture would most likely be excessive axial 
loading of the femur, and that the parents offered no history providing such a mechanism. 
Footnotes - -
n2 Because of the abuse referral, Z.D. was admitted to the hospital. 
End Footnotes 
[**5] 
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[*P5] Because Father was employed by DCFS as an in-home child welfare worker, DCFS 
retained an independent investigator, Paul Dean, to conduct an investigation of the 
circumstances surrounding Z.D.'s fracture. Dean first saw Z.D. at Primary. Z.D. was wearing 
only a diaper, shirt, and fabric splint on his left leg. No marks were visible on Z.D.'s exposed 
body parts. When Dean interviewed Father and Mother, neither of them could provide an 
explanation consistent with the mechanism Dr. Herman had described. 
[*P6] On Tuesday, November 19, 2002, Mother, Father, and Z.D.'s grandparents were at 
the hospital when Herman stopped by the hospital room. Mother's mother (Grandmother) 
asked Dr. Herman whether the fracture could have occurred during an incident with a 
baby walker on the previous Wednesday, November 13, 2002, where Z.D.'s leg became stuck 
in the walker and Grandmother released his leg by pulling it through the hole of the walker. 
Herman did not acknowledge the question and, instead, continued to talk. Grandmother 
asked the same question again. Herman continued to write on his notepad and then left the 
room. The next day, Grandmother again posed the walker question [**6] to Herman, who 
then said that the walker incident was not a possible cause of the fracture. He did not follow 
up on Grandmother's question at that time. n3 
Footnotes 
n3 During trial, when asked about his response to Grandmother's inquiry, Herman testified 
that he did not feel that the walker incident would have created the appropriate mechanism, 
or the appropriate kind of force, to cause the fracture. 
End Footnotes 
[*P7] Later, on December 11, 2003, the family requested a meeting with Herman and 
other members of the Center for Safe and Healthy Families in order to present the walker 
incident as a possible mechanism for the fracture. Grandmother gave a demonstration of 
how she had tried to place Z.D. in his walker, but his left leg became stuck, his knee bent 
with his foot behind him. In her attempt to extricate his wedged leg, she placed her left hand 
and thumbs on his left leg above his knee and pushed, and then pulled his foot down through 
the hole of the walker with her right hand. Z.D. let out a shrill, vigorous cry, but [**7] 
calmed down within fifteen seconds. 
[*P8] In a separate meeting, after Grandmother demonstrated the walker incident, the 
Primary doctors met and agreed that their opinions were unchanged by the demonstration. 
Kari Cunningham, Primary's liaison to DCFS and a child protective services worker with DCFS, 
was present at the meeting with the doctors. She observed that the doctors agreed that 
someone could have caused the fracture using their hand, but that the force involved in the 
walker incident would not have been sufficient to cause the fracture. Cunningham testified 
that, in discussing the mechanism and forces involved, the doctors did not discuss the 
medications Z.D. had been taking, the fact that he was often placed in a burrito wrap, and 
Z.D.'s activities in the days between Wednesday and Saturday. 
[*P9] Dr. G. William Nixon, a pediatric radiologist at Primary, did not participate in this 
meeting. Nixon had earlier opined that the fracture was not caused by direct axial loading, 
consistent with Herman's opinion, but rather was caused by angular leverage. Dr. John 
Smith, a pediatric orthopedist at Primary, was also not present during the walker 
demonstration on [**8] December 11, 2002, but was consulted via telephone. Smith wrote 
a letter dated December 11, 2002 in which he explained that the fracture could result from 
the forceful wedging of the leg over a fulcrum (as in the walker incident), but that it would be 
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"difficult to know the degree of force that would be required to produce this fracture by this 
mechanism." 
[*P10] At trial, Herman elucidated his position regarding the possible mechanism of the 
fracture: 
We [the doctors] all agreed that that [the walker incident] would not be the 
typical mechanism or the one we would usually see to explain that fracture and 
I certainly have not said that that would have been impossible to be the 
mechanism. I have that — and it's still my opinion that it was unlikely that that 
was the mechanism. 
In clarifying his view, Herman said that while the walker incident was a possible mechanism 
for the fracture, it was not the likely mechanism. As to whether he significantly disagreed 
with Nixon as to the mechanism of the fracture, he answered, "Significant is a word — I 
mean we had disagreements about the actual mechanism that could have caused this but 
would I describe [**9] them as significant? No, sir." 
[*P11] On cross-examination, Dean said it would have been important for him to know 
whether there was a disagreement among the doctors as to the probable mechanism of the 
fracture; however, Dean was not made aware of the differing opinions. Dean also testified 
that he did not know, and did not consider the fact, that Z.D. had been taking Tylenol 
between the time of the walker incident and when he entered the emergency room on 
Sunday morning. Nor was Dean aware that Z.D. had been suffering from constipation and an 
earache, had been teething during that time period, and had received a flu shot on Friday. 
Dean admitted that all of these factors would have been important for him to know. 
• [*P12] In his testimony, Herman identified three factors to be considered in investigating 
Z.D.'s fracture: 1) the type of fracture, which helps to determine the mechanism and force; 
2) the age of the fracture; and 3) the symptoms associated with the fracture. He explained 
that, taken together, these factors demonstrated that Z.D.'s femur fracture was the result 
of nonaccidental trauma inflicted on Saturday, November 16, rather than the walker 
incident [**10] on Wednesday, November 13. 
[*P13] As to mechanism, Herman testified that he was "51/49" percent certain that the 
fracture was caused by a significant axial force applied to a bent knee. As to the force, 
Herman thought it unlikely that the walker couldgenerate the forces required to fracture 
the femur. As to the age of the fracture, both Wednesday (the date of the walker incident) 
and Saturday (the date Herman noted Z.D. manifested symptoms), fit within the time period 
identified as when the fracture could have occurred. As to the type and timing of symptoms, 
Herman thought that if the walker incident had been the cause of the fracture, then Mother 
and Father would have noticed symptoms of a broken leg prior to Saturday. Herman 
maintained that symptoms of a broken leg would have been apparent, especially when Z.D.'s 
leg was moved during daily activities like diaper changes and clothing changes. Regardless of 
Z.D.'s teething, earache, constipation, taking of Tylenol, absence of external injuries, and the 
fact that he was often tightly swaddled in a burrito wrap, which mimicked a splint, Herman 
doubted that the symptoms of a broken leg could be hidden from a vigilant 
caretaker [**11] from Wednesday to Saturday. 
[*P14] Mother and Father called a number of witnesses. David Ingebretsen, an expert in 
the field of bio-mechanical engineering, testified that the fracture pattern was consistent 
with the forces identified by the walker incident. Debbie Hosseini, a registered nurse who 
works with the early intervention program helping premature babies with their development, 
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had come to Z.D.'s home every month to observe him. She testified that he was a very 
happy baby, always smiling, and very easy to console. She never saw any bruising or 
swelling on Z.D. 
[*P15] Finally, Dr. Steven Scott, an expert in pediatric orthopedics, gave extensive 
testimony. Scott testified that the femur fracture did not follow the typical pattern of 
nonaccidental trauma, and he disagreed with Herman as to the probable mechanism. After 
examining the fracture pattern, and feeling that it did not fit the typical pattern that is 
normally seen with nonaccidental trauma, he wanted to know if there was an explanation for 
the fracture that fit the fracture pattern. Scott believed that the fracture pattern required 
a marriage of two forces in the same mechanism. He thought that Grandmother's [**12] 
walker demonstration "mimicked the forces exactly that would be needed to produce the 
fracture pattern." As to the force, he testified that there is no real way to know how much 
force is required to break a bone on a particular person, but the walker incident created a 
leverage force, and leverage forces create great force when little force is applied. 
Additionally, the area of the bone where the fracture occurred was a weaker area of the 
femur, and Z.D.'s delayed bone age gave him a weaker bone because it had less mass and 
was composed of immature woven bone, making it structurally weak. 
[*P16] In discussing the symptoms of a fracture, Scott agreed with Herman that bone 
pain is typically worse with any kind of manipulation or movement, but thought that in a child 
of Z.D.'s age, symptoms would be more generalized fussiness, irritability, crying, and lack of 
movement of his leg. He also explained that wrapping Z.D. in a burrito wrap would influence 
a caretaker's ability to detect symptoms because swaddling is exactly what happens when a 
child has a splint. Scott's opinion as to the onset of symptoms was also different from 
Herman's. Scott did not find it remarkable for three [**13] days to elapse before Mother 
and Father noticed symptoms of the fracture. As examples, Scott said that in the eighteen 
years he had been involved in taking care of children's fractures, it was not uncommon to 
see even a verbal child brought in two or three days after the injury because the parents 
attributed the symptoms to something else. He had also seen nonverbal children who had 
fractures for days, or even more than a week, before caretakers (or medical professionals) 
realized there was a problem that required medical attention. Scott pointed to the numerous 
physicians who examined Z.D. at Primary and described him as cheerful, interactive, alert, 
and fussy, but consolable. At the hospital, Z.D. presented neither localized nor generalized 
symptoms. Further, at least six physical examinations of Z.D. specifically noted that there 
were no skin lesions, bruises, lacerations, abrasions, burns, or scars. Scott concluded that if 
the mechanism that caused the fracture were a direct force, as Herman believed it to be, 
then he would expect bruising around the leg because the force it takes to bruise soft tissues 
is less than the force it takes to break a bone. OQ the other hand, with the [**14] walker 
incident, the amount of force needed to be applied to the skin in order for the femur to 
fracture, is well below the amount required to bruise the skin. He also cited a study where 
over ninety percent of the children with suspected nonaccidental fractures also had soft 
tissue injuries. 
[*P17] After receiving all of the evidence, the juvenile court found that Herman 
"unequivocally testified that the femur fracture was the result of non-accidental trauma, 
and would have required significant and excessive force to cause such a complex femur 
fracture." The court was convinced that the fracture occurred on Saturday when Z.D. was 
in Father's care because the court was both "astonished and dumbfounded" as to why the 
symptoms would be absent on Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, and on Saturday morning, "but 
yet make such a sudden and demonstrative appearance on the afternoon of the same day." 
[*P18] The court concluded that Z.D. was abused and neglected while in Father's care, and 
that A.D. was a neglected child as a result of being in the same home as Z.D. See Utah Code 
Ann. 5 78-3a-103(l)(sHi?(E? (2002). Z.D. and A.D. were removed from [**15] the home. 
The court ordered DCFS to submit a reunification service plan. n4 Father and Mother appeal 
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the trial court's adjudication. 
Footnotes 
n4 Father and Mother successfully completed their service plan. DCFS involvement was 
eventually terminated, and the children were returned to the custody of Father and Mother 
without condition. 
End Footnotes-
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[*P19] Father argues that the juvenile court erred in finding that the State established 
abuse by clear and convincing evidence. See Utah R. Juv. P. 41(b). HN1Tfhe standard for 
assessing whether evidence is "clear and convincing" has been articulated as follows: 
While it rests primarily with the trial court to determine whether the evidence is 
clear and convincing, its finding is not necessarily conclusive, for in cases 
governed by the rule requiring such evidence the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the finding should be considered by the appellate court in the light of 
that rule. . . . In such cases it is the duty of the appellate court [**16] in 
reviewing the evidence to determine, not whether the trier of facts could 
reasonably conclude that it is more probable that the fact to be proved exists 
than that it does not, . . . but whether the trier of facts could reasonably conclude 
that it is highly probable that the fact exists. 
Lovett v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., 4 Utah 2d 76, 286 P.2d 1065, 1068 (1955) 
(quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added). HN2^nfKn appellate court does not give 
factual determinations made by a trial judge the same amount of deference given to factual 
determinations made by a jury — that is, an appellate court does not, as a matter of course, 
resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the appellee." Alta Indus, v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 
1282, 1284 n.2 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
I. Type of Fracture 
[*P20] Even disregarding the testimony of defense witnesses Ingebretsen and Scott, who 
both testified that the fracture pattern was consistent with the forces identified by the 
walker incident, the remaining evidence presented varying opinions as to the probable 
mechanism. n5 Contrary to the court's finding, Herman's testimony [**17] was anything 
but "unequivocal." He testified that he could only be "51/49" percent certain that the 
fracture was caused by a significant axial force applied to a bent knee. This testimony, 
standing alone, is far from clear and convincing. Further, neither one of the State's own 
witnesses — Smith and Nixon — bolstered the opinion of Herman. Although Smith refrained 
from estimating the degree of force required, he thought the fracture could have resulted 
from the walker incident. Nixon thought the probable cause of the fracture was angular 
leverage. 
Footnotes 
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n5 Scott agreed that an axial load could cause such a fracture. He described two possible 
scenarios: 1) the child stands with locked knees and is then slammed down or dropped, so 
that the force passes through the feet and into the knee and femur; and 2) the child 
experiences a blow to the end of the knee, directly over the kneecap. He explained that the 
first instance was unlikely because Z.D., as a nonambulatory child, did not have the muscle 
tone to stand and lock his knees. Additionally, the fracture pattern did not match that 
scenario. The second instance was unlikely because a direct blow strong enough to fracture 
a bone should leave a contusion, swelling, or welt over the kneecap. Again, the fracture 
pattern was not consistent with such a mechanism. 
End Footnotes 
[**18] 
[*P21] As explained by both Scott and Ingebretsen, and uncontested by any of the State's 
witnesses, if the mechanism causing the fracture is assumed to be the result of an axial 
load, then more force would be required to cause the fracture than would be required by the 
leverage force created by the walker incident. None of the expert witnesses could provide an 
opinion as to how much force would be required to cause the fracture with either an axial 
load or the walker incident. 
II. Age of Fracture 
[*P22] Both Wednesday and Saturday fall within the time period identified by the experts 
as to when the fracture likely occurred; thus, this factor does not help to establish that the 
fracture occurred on Saturday. 
III. Symptoms Associated with Fracture 
[*P23] There was a great deal of conflicting evidence associated with the type and timing 
of symptoms. The court was "both astonished and dumbfounded" as to why the symptoms 
would be absent on Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, and Saturday morning, and "yet make 
such a sudden and demonstrative appearance on the afternoon of the same day." Yet, the 
court also recognized that Father saw very little of Z.D. on Wednesday, [**19] Thursday, 
and Friday, so that when the symptoms seemed to Father to "suddenly appear" on Saturday, 
Father had no way of comparing the symptoms exhibited on Saturday with the symptoms 
exhibited in the days prior. Further, the court didjiot acknowledge that Mother had given 
Z.D. regular doses of Tylenol on Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday, with the last dose being 
given at approximately 4:00-5:00 a.m. on Saturday. Even then, the court was not persuaded 
that "minimal doses of minor pain killers" could mask Z.D.'s symptoms. Yet, the State's 
witness, Sipher, testified that Tylenol may very well influence whether a caretaker is able to 
detect symptoms of an injury. Herman testified that children with fractures are prescribed 
something stronger than Tylenol or ibuprofen for pain, and he was surprised to find that the 
emergency department had initially given Z.D. only Tylenol after discovering the fracture. 
[*P24] The court found that "medical experts testified and generally agreed that the pain 
and the symptoms attendant to the leg fracture would be significant and that the fracture 
would be extremely painful"; further, that the symptoms would be "readily detectable and 
observable [**20] by a caretaker." Yet the court made no mention of Sipher's testimony 
that it would not be surprising for the caretakers to attribute Z.D.'s fussiness to teething. 
Defense witness, Scott, testified that, in his eighteen years of treating children's fractures, it 
was not uncommon for nonverbal children, in the charge of medical professionals, to go for 
days, or even a week, after sustaining a fracture before receiving treatment because the 
medical professionals did not realize that a fracture had occurred. The court found that 
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Father described Z.D.'s symptoms as significant, and that the hospital physicians and other 
doctors confirmed this description. Yet, Scott pointed to the medical reports from Primary 
itself, wherein Z.D. was described as cheerful, interactive, alert, and fussy, but consolable. 
Even when the first doctor at Primary examined Z.D. and moved his leg, he could not find 
anything wrong. 
[*P25] Perhaps the most significant symptom was the one not present. Noticeably 
removed from the court's findings and the State's case entirely, is any mention of, or 
explanation for, the absence of external injuries. Z.D. sustained no lesions, welts, bruising, 
swelling, redness, [**21] burns, abrasions, lacerations, or scars. If the fracture were 
caused by an axial load, the mechanism believed by some State witnesses to be the probable 
cause, it would almost always be accompanied by a soft tissue injury like bruising or swelling. 
[*P26] Because the "explanations as to the cause of the injury provided by the parents 
[was] inconsistent with the medical testimony,w the court determined that clear and 
convincing evidence had established that the fracture occurred on Saturday afternoon while 
Z.D. was in Father's care. However, we cannot say that, given the evidence presented, "the 
trier of facts could reasonably conclude that it [was] highly probable" that the fracture was 
the result of nonaccidental trauma inflicted by Father on Saturday afternoon. Lovett v. 
Continental Bank & Trust Co., 4 Utah 2d 76, 286 P.2d 1065, 1068 (1955). 
CONCLUSION 
[*P27] The evidence does not clearly and convincingly establish that Z.D.'s fracture was 
caused by an axial load sometime on Saturday when he was in Father's care. 
[*P28] We therefore reverse. 
Russell W. Bench, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, [**22] 
Presiding Judge 
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge 
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, IN THE THIRD DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, in the interest of j AFFIDAVIT OF DR. BRUCE 
.' HERMAN 
DUNSMORE, ALEXIS (09/19/00) 
DUNSMORE, ZACHARY (04/06/02) j Case No. 169373,169372 
Child(ren) under 18 years of age. ? Judge Johansson 
I, Dr. Bruce Herman, state under oath, as follows: 
1. I met with Lisa and Brig Dunsmore, on both November 18* and 19th, 2002, at Primary 
Children's Medical Center. I also talked briefly with the maternal grandmother, Linda Johnson, 
onNovernberl9,2003. 
2. I do not believe that Lisa Dunsmore asked me on November 18th or 19* whether 
Zachary's leg fracture could have been caused in a baby walker. The first time I heard mention 
of a walker as a possible cause of the broken leg was on November 19,2002, when the maternal 
grandmother, Linda Johnson, asked me if Zachary's leg being caught in a baby walker could 
have caused the fracture. No other details were offered at that time, and no date was mentioned 
by Ms. Johnson of what happened. At no time during any of my conversations with the parents 
and Ms. Johnson did anyone state that Lisa had been present when the baby's leg was 
JUN 12 2003 
, 3rd District 
Juvenile Court 
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manipulated in the walker. That includes on December 11, 2002 when the entire Safe and 
Healthy Families Team of physicians met with the extended family and were told the details by 
Ms. Johnson. 
3. In my meetings with Brig and Lisa Dunsmore, I specifically asked them if Zachary 
had shown any sign of favoring his left leg or any change from his "baseline" of fussiness during 
the week preceding £is admission to Primary Childrens' Hospital on November 17, 2002. 
Neither of them could identify any signs that his leg was in pain or that there was any change in 
his "baseline" behavior until after noon on Saturday, November 16,2002, Neither Brig nor Lisa 
Dunsmore told me in those meetings that Brig Dunsmore had not even provided care for Zachary 
from Wednesday the 131* of November until Saturday morning the 16th of November. Brig and 
Lisa were asked specifically if Zachary had shown any signs of pain when his clothes or diapers 
were changed during the prior week and both denied he had shown any signs of pain. Neither 
Brig nor Lisa Dunsmore told me that they changed his diapers and his clothes without touching 
or manipulating his left leg. 
4. Both Lisa and Brig Dunsmore told me on November 18,2002, that Zachary had been 
bearing weight on both his legs the morning of November 16,2002 prior to Lisa leaving the 
home. Further, Brig Dunsmore told me that Zachaiy had been bearing weight on both his legs 
after Lisa left to go shopping that same morning and that he had been "fine". The Dunsmores 
told me in these meetings that Zachary liked to bounce on their knees. They demonstrated with 
their hands how this happened. 
5, If Brig and Lisa Dunsmore have testified in the juvenile court trial that they never said 
Zachary bad been bearing weight on both legs on Saturday morning, November 16,2002,1 
believe they are mistaken. I did not make up that detail, and Lisa Dunsmore repeated that detail 
during the family meeting on December 11,2002, having been specifically asked about that by 
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Dr. Lori Frasier, 
Dated this JL day of June, 2003 
Bruce Herman, M.D. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this ^ L day of June 2003 
NOTARY H1MJ 
SUSAN K. GREAVES 
100N*.UodfcafDrfc* 
Sift UtoCfty, Wall 54115 
My CommfftJoA Expfitt 
September 14, SOW 
. STATE OF PTAB ^ 
Notary Public residing in 
Salt Lake County 
My Commission Expires f**/f ^ j T 
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ATTACHMENT 4 
Letter from Bruce Herman, M.D. 
Karen Hansen, M.D. and 
Lori D. Fraiser, M.D. 
December 17, 2002. 
State's Exh. 7. 
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n r ^ S 100 North Medial Drive 
rfmi PRIMARY CHILDREN'S MEDICAL CENTER (8ODS88-200O 
1HC A Serrice of I titer mountain Health Care (801) 588-2460 Fax 
NOTICE OF CONFIDENTIALITY 
This document is for me express purpose of facilitating the Utah State Law pertaining to the Reporting and investigation of Child 
Abuse or Neglect (Section 62A-4a^03, or as amended). Release to anyone, other than those directly authorized in the legal 
process, is illegal and unethical. 
December 17, 2002 
RE: ZACHARY DUNSMORE 
DOB: 4/6/02 
On December 11, 2002 a meeting was held with the family of Zachary Dunsmore to 
provide further information concerning his injuries. Present at the meeting were 
physicians from the Safe and Healthy Families, Dr. Bruce Herman, Dr. Karen Hansen 
and Dr. Lori Frasier. Julie Bradshaw from Safe and Healthy Families was also present. 
Paul Dean from SIPAPU and Kari Cunningham from DCFS were present. The child's 
pediatrician Dr. Dave Folland was present. Zachary's mother and father Lisa and Brigg 
Dunsmore as well as Brigg's father and Lisa's parents Linda and Brent Johnson were 
present. The purpose of the meeting was to clarify history from the family concerning 
Zachary's injuries. 
Grandmother gave a history of changing Zachary's diaper on November 21st. She 
states that he tried to reach down and grab his left foot and bent his leg up and she 
heard a painful cry. This reminded her of a previous event that occurred on November 
13th. She had gone to Zachary's home at approximately 11 AM. She tried to place him 
in his walker. She brought this walker today and used it to demonstrate the history 
provided. His right foot made it through the hole in his walker but his left leg became 
stuck. His knee bent with his foot behind him. Grandmother states that she pushed 
with her left hand and thumbs on his left leg above his knee and with her left hand and 
pulled down his foot with her right hand. She states' that he cried vigorously but 
calmed down within 15 seconds. She states that after that time he used his leg 
normally. Further questioning to the family revealed that they did not notice Zachary to 
be in pain over the next few days. Specifically they were able to get him into and out 
of his pajamas and change his diaper without-significant pain. On Friday November 
15th he was seen by Dr. Folland. Dr. Folland did not note any abnormalities in his leg 
exam. The child was given a flu shot in his left leg. Mother states that the nurse held 
his left leg down while he was sitting in her lap. She states that he did cry with the 
shots and mother could not differentiate pain from Zachary being held down versus 
pain from the shot. 
The events of Saturday November 16 were also reviewed. Mother states that she got 
up in the morning and placed Zachary on the floor and that he played on the floor. He 
was placed in his walker for a brief time as well. She did not notice anything unusual 
about his behavior that morning and left at approximately 1010. She got back at 
approximately 1830 and at that time noted that he was not moving his left leg and 
appeared to be in pain when his leg was palpated. The family sought care the next 
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morning because of the continued symptoms and an x-ray performed at that time 
revealed a left femur fracture. Brigg was unable to provide any history of the events 
while he was caring for Zachary on advice from his lawyer. 
Lisa then provided a history that she felt may have caused his skull fracture. She 
relates an incident occurring during the week before Halloween. Mother states that she 
placed him in a Graco swing. She brought the swing today and demonstrated the 
history she provided. She turned on the swing and went to the bathroom. When she 
was coming out of the bathroom she heard a thump and then heard Zachary cry. She 
states that she found him lying face up on the bar of the swing. She picked him up and 
he stopped crying immediately. She states that he continued to act normally and eat 
well for the rest of that day and the next several days. Mother does not remember any 
swelling nor tenderness of his scalp. The surface of the floor was a padded burbor 
carpet.
 t 
During the meeting several family members spoke, supporting the family. Dr. Folland 
also spoke positively of the parents, grandparents, and extended social support system. 
Dr. Folland spoke of Zachary as a very happy, mellow infant. Of note was that Mr. 
Johnson remarked that Zachary did have periods of fussiness, usually in the evening, 
and that he calmed when being held. 
Drs. Herman, Hansen and Frasier subsequently met with Kari Cunningham and Paul 
Dean. Dr. John Smith was also consulted. The films were reviewed with Dr. Smith and 
the proposed mechanism was discussed. It was felt by the physicians from Safe and 
Healthy Families as well as Dr. Smith that unreasonable forces would have been 
required to cause the femur fracture. It was also felt that Zachary would become 
symptomatic soon after the injury. There had been concerns from the family and Dr. 
Folland about Zachary's high pain threshold. It should be noted that numerous 
witnesses have stated that Zachary responded appropriately to painful stimuli. This 
included his flu shot on Friday November 15th as well as an intramuscular injection that 
Paul Dean witnessed Zachary receiving in the hospital. In view of Zachary's apparently 
normal pain response, it is highly unlikely thafZachary would have remained 
asymptomatic for several days after an injury on November 13th and then become 
symptomatic on November 16th. It is also highly unlikely that the mechanism described 
by Grandmother caused the fracture. 
The mechanism for the skull fracture was also discussed. It was felt that the episode 
described by mother would be highly unlikely to cause an occipital skull fracture. The 
occipital bone is quite difficult to fracture and would require significant force. A minor 
fall such as described by mother would be unlikely to provide the necessary forces to 
fracture the occipital bone. 
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No history has been provided to adequately explain either Zachary's femur fracture or 
his skull fracture. Therefore, non-accidental injury must be highly considered. This was 
discussed with Paul Dean as well as with Kari Cunningham. It was also discussed in a 
subsequent meeting with Dr. Folland. 
It is our feeling that Zachary and his parents have significant social support systems. It 
is our opinion that the risks of subsequent injury to Zachary are low in his present social 
situation. We will work with DCFS and SIPAPU to arrange a protective situation that is 
equitable to the family while still providing safety for Zachary. 
It should be noted that Zachary's follow up skeletal survey on December 2nd showed no 
new injuries. It showed a well-developed callus of his left femur. 
Bruce Herman, M.D. 
Associate Professor 
University of Utah Health Sciences Center 
Center for Safe and Healthy Families 
Primary Children's Medical Center 
Karen Hansen, M.D. 
Associate Professor ':'~ 
University of Utah Health Sciences Center 
Center for Safe and Healthy Families 
Primary Children's Medicaj Center 
Lori D. Frasier, M.D. 
Associate Professor 
University of Utah Health Sciences Center 
Center for Safe and Healthy Families 
Medical Director, Medical Assessment Team 
Primary Children's Medical Center 
cc: Kari Cunningham, DCFS 
Paul Dean, SIPAPU 
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ATTACHMENT 5 
John T. Smith Letter 
December 11,2002. 
Def.Exh. 15. 
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C(mt£U¥0 Cow nlnj*z. 
DUNSMORE, ZACHARY A 
Chart #31266 
December 11, 2002 
This note is dictated in clarification of the injuries sustained by Zachary and addresses 
possible etiology and mechanism. This note is generated to clarify issues and possible 
mechanism related to this fracture. My first evaluation of Zachary occurred on November 
27, 2002. At that time, he was noted to have a fracture of the metaphysis of the distal 
femur, which had significant fracture callus present. At that time, it was my impression 
that the fracture was between 14 in 20 days out from the initial injury. 
In reviewing the chronology of this fracture, the grandmother noted that she possibly 
Injured the leg by placing the leg through the footing of the walker on November 13, 
2002. The child was taken in for routine immunizations on November 15. At that time, it 
was felt the child did not have pain in the distal femur while being held down for these 
immunizations. He was seen for his initial evaluation of this fracture on November 17, 
2002, at which time the distal metaphyseal fracture was documented. I was not involved 
in his care until November 27, 2002. 
Regarding possible etiology, the most common way that I've seen this fracture is due to 
an accidental fall off a bed while engaging in diaper changing or other activities. I 
explained to the family that the fracture could occur as a result of a forceful wedging of 
the leg over a fulcrum. It is difficult to know the degree of force that would be required to 
produce this fracture by this mechanism. There are certainly no biomechanical testing or 
other guidelines to determine this degree of force. In addition, I feel that once this type 
of fracture occurred, given the amount of displacement on the initial film, that we would 
expect to have significant pain with activities such as diaper changing or any manipulation 
of the limb. It is, therefore, difficult to match the chronology of the fracture to the onset 
of symptoms being approximatelylhree days later. I cannot determine a fracture etiology 
with any certainty based on the fracture pattern that is seen. 
This information was discussed with Dr. Bruce Herman and the Child Protection Team, and 
I was asked to document it for the medical record. 
John T. Smith, M.D. 
CC: Bruce Herman, M.D. 
David Folland, M.D. 
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ATTACHMENT 6 
Utah Supreme Court Order 
Granting Certiorari 
December 22, 2004. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, in the 
interest of, 
Z.D. and A.D., 
children under eighteen 
years of age, 
Case No. 20040837-SC 
State of Utah 
Petitioner 
v. 
S . B. D. and L.D., 
Respondents 
ORDER 
This matter is before the court upon the Petitions for Writ 
of Certiorari, filed by the State of Utah and the Guardian ad 
Litem on September 29, 2004. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is 
granted only as to the following issue: 
Whether the court of appeals applied the correct standard of 
review in its assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence. 
FOR THE COURT 
Date ^ ^ jmy / W9M/&* Christine M. Durham 
Chief Justice 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
